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ABSTRACT
This article seeks to create an early empirical benchmark on registrations of marks that would have
failed registration as “scandalous” or “immoral” under Lanham Act Section 2(a) before the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s In re Brunetti decision of December 2017 and to briefly examine the
possible outcome of the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari on that case. The Brunetti decision
followed closely behind the Supreme Court’s Matal v. Tam and put an end to examiners denying
registration on the basis of Section 2(a). In Tam, the Supreme Court reasoned that Section 2(a)
embodied restrictions on free speech, in the case of “disparaging” marks, which were clearly
unconstitutional. The Federal circuit followed that same logic and labeled those same Section 2(a)
restrictions as unconstitutional in the case of “scandalous” and “immoral” marks. Before the ink was
dry in Brunetti, commentators wondered how lifting the Section 2(a) restrictions would affect the
volume of registrations of marks previously made unregistrable by that same section. Predictions
ran the gamut from “business as usual” to scenarios where those marks would proliferate to
astronomical levels. A little more than a year out from Brunetti, it is hard to say with certainty what
could happen, but this study has gathered the number of registrations as of March of 2019 and the
early signs seem to indicate a future not much altered, despite early concerns to the contrary. In
January 2019 the Supreme Court agreed to review the Federal Circuit’s decision and that review
will lead to clarification on whether scandalous and immoral marks are also protected by the First
Amendment. Shortly before publication of this article, on June 24th, 2019, the Supreme Court
decided the Brunetti case. In essence, the Court upheld the Federal Circuit’s decision maintaining
the unconstitutionality of Section 2(a) restrictions on registration of “scandalous” and “immoral”
marks. A short postscript analyzing the Supreme Court’s decision concludes this article.
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THE F WORD - AN EARLY EMPIRICAL STUDY OF TRADEMARK
REGISTRATION OF SCANDALOUS AND IMMORAL MARKS IN THE AFTERMATH
OF THE IN RE BRUNETTI DECISION
VICENC FELIU*
I. INTRODUCTION
To a company or an artist trying to create a recognizable brand, especially in a
crowded field, a name can be everything. Some businesses and artists have
historically chosen edgier names or brands to help their product standout from the
“run of the mill.” Those more daring souls willing to use edgier, less traditional
marks generally ran afoul of federal trademark law when trying to obtain protection
for their marks through federal registration if their marks where considered to be
1
immoral, scandalous or disparaging. The provisions in the Lanham Act against
immoral, scandalous or disparaging marks were struck down by a couple of decisions
2
in 2017.
Commentators worried about the repercussions of both decisions,
predicting that the registration system would either be flooded with scandalous mark
3
4
applications or that nothing much would change. This article seeks to look at the
results of those decisions striking down the provisions against scandalous marks and
to establish an early benchmark on those results for future study.

* © Vicenc Feliu 2019. J.D., LL.M., M.L.I.S., Associate Dean for Library Services and Professor
of Law, Nova Southeastern Shepard Broad College of Law, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The author
would like to thank his wife, Charlene Cain, reference librarian at the NSU – Florida, Alvin
Sherman Library, and Kelly Ann DesRosiers, JD Candidate 2019 NSU – Florida, Shepard Broad
College of Law, for their invaluable help with research, editing and number crunching. Also, thanks
to Alison Rosenberg and Michelle Murray, reference librarians at the Shepard Broad College of Law,
Panza Maurer Law Library, for their help with citations.
1 Lanham Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2012).
No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the
goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal register on account of
its nature unless it—
(a) Consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter
which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead .
2 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017); In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
3 David A. Bell, Jason P. Bloom & Wesley Lewis, New Law: Federal Circuit Finds Ban On
Scandalous/Immoral
Trademarks
Unconstitutional,
HAYNESBOONE
(Jan.
3,
2018),
http://www.haynesboone.com/Alerts/ban-on-scandalous-immoral-trademarks-unconstitutional (“The
impact of this decision will extend well beyond Carlin’s seven dirty words; indeed, the subjective
nature of how to apply 2(a) has resulted in a wide swath of refused marks that now may be suitable
for registration.”).
4 Christina S. Loza, Matal v. Tam: Disparaging Trademarks, Like the Slants, Can Be Registered
Trademarks, ORANGE COUNTY LAW. 24, 27 (2017) (“There is, of course, a concern that the floodgates
have been opened. Will every hateful person file marks and begin filling our Trademark Register
with racial slurs? There is certainly a chance.”).
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II. BACKGROUND
American trademark law recognizes three kinds of trademark rights: common
5
law, state registration rights and the rights obtained through federal registration.
Common law rights arise from first use of a mark in commerce in a geographical
6
location. Therefore, common law rights are “limited to the territory in which the
7
mark is known and recognized” as a source indicator by the public.
Because
common law rights arise from use, there is no registration procedure, and the person
8
wishing to use the mark merely needs to begin using it. However, because of the
lack of registration in common law use, there is no public record of the right to use or
9
when use began. All states in the US have some sort of trademark registration
procedures that allows a person or business entity using a mark in commerce to
10
record the use of that mark.
State registration confers upon the user a record of
use but does not grant protection beyond the geographical borders of the state. State
registration is cheaper than federal registration but does not really grant the mark
11
owner much beyond the limits of common law rights. While federal registration of
a mark is not a prerequisite for use of that mark in commerce, registration provides
12
the mark with certain expanded benefits. Federal registration gives the trademark
owner the right to use the registered trademark symbol; the right to file a trademark
infringement lawsuit in federal court and to obtain monetary remedies, including
infringer’s profits, damages, costs and, in some cases, treble damages and attorneys’
fees. It also bars the registration of other confusingly similar marks, and it can serve

5 See generally James M. Treece & David Stephenson, A Look at American Trademark Law, 29
SW. L.J. 547, 547 (1975).
6 Cornaby’s LLC v. Carnet, LLC, No. 2:14-cv-00462-JNP-DBP, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130716,
at *17 (D. Utah Aug. 15, 2017). (“[C]onsistent[] use[] [of] the Ultra Gel mark in Idaho and Utah[]
create[ed] common law trademark rights in those states.”).
7 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc), as corrected (Feb. 11, 2016),
aff’d sub nom., Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
8 Cornaby’s LLC v. Carnet, LLC, No. 2:14-cv-00462-JNP-DBP, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130716,
at *12 (D. Utah Aug. 15, 2017) (“Rights in a trademark are determined by the date of the mark’s
first use in commerce.”).
9 Robert S. Bramson, Intellectual Property as Collateral - Patents, Trade Secrets, Trademarks
and Copyrights, 36 BUS. LAW. 1567, 1604 (1981) (“[T]rademark rights exist independent of any
registration or application . ”).
10
State Trademark Registration in the United States, INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N,
https://www.inta.org/TrademarkBasics/FactSheets/Pages/StateTrademarkRegistrationsUSFactShee
t.aspx (last updated July 2014). (“The United States has a two-tiered system of trademark
protection: federal and state. . . . [A] state registration gives the registrant trademark rights only
within the territory of the state.”).
11 Id. (“A federal registration has priority over a state trademark registration . ”).
12 Lanham Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012) (“The owner of a trademark used in commerce may
request registration of its trademark on the principal register . . . .”). The Lanham Act establishes
two national trademark registries. See id. The Principal Register for trademarks that are being
“used in commerce” or those to which the applicant has a “bona fide” intent to use in commerce in
the near future. See id. §§ 1(a)(1), (b)(1), §§ 1051(a)(1), 1051(b)(1), and the Supplemental Register for
trademarks that are “capable of distinguishing the applicant’s goods or services” but not yet
registrable on the Principal Register. See Id. § 23(a), § 1091. However, as § 1(a)(1) indicates, the
owner of the mark may also use that mark in commerce without the benefit of registration relying
on the protection of common law rights. Id. §§ 1(a)(1), 1051(a)(1).
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13

as the basis for an international trademark application. Registration provides a
statutory presumption that the mark is valid, the registrant is the owner of the mark
14
and the registrant has the exclusive right to use the registered mark. Without the
prima facie presumption of validity provided by registration, the mark owner must
15
take the route of legal action to prove ownership and validity of the mark.
Registration gives the registrant nationwide priority to use the mark based on the
filing date and allows the mark to become incontestable after five years on the
Principal Register, giving the registrant exclusive right, subject to certain statutory
16
defenses, to use the mark.
After five consecutive years of continuous use in
17
commerce, a registered mark will acquire the status of incontestable.
Incontestability does not mean that the mark is invincible but it does give the mark
owner a stronger position by underscoring the mark’s validity and making it safe
18
from attack on the grounds that the mark lacks distinctiveness.
Finally,
registration confers a long list of additional rights to the mark holder, including
19
recovery of treble damages for willful infringement, complete defense against state
20
or common law claims of dilution,
right to prevent cyber squatters’
21
misappropriation of domain names, the ability to block importation of infringing
22
goods into the U.S. and a simplified process for international registration with the
23
Madrid Protocol. These benefits make registration a desirable step, and any
See 3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 19:9 (5th ed. 2018).
15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (2012) (“A certificate of registration of a mark upon the principal register
provided by this chapter shall be prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of
the registration of the mark.”).
15 Retail Servs., Inc. v. Freebies Publ’g, 364 F.3d 535, 542 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Under the Lanham
Act, the issuance of a certificate of registration arms the registrant with “prima facie evidence of the
validity of the registered mark.”).
16 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 19:3; see also id. § 19:9 (listing seven of the “procedural and
substantive legal advantages” of registration).
17 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (2012)
[T]he right of the owner to use such registered mark in commerce for the goods or
services on or in connection with which such registered mark has been in
continuous use for five consecutive years subsequent to the date of such
registration and is still in use in commerce, shall be incontestable.
18 Retail Servs., 364 F.3d at 548 (“The validity of the same registered mark, after qualifying for
incontestable status, is conclusively presumed and may not be challenged as merely descriptive.”).
19 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b) (2012) (“Treble damages for use of counterfeit mark”).
20 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(6) (2012) (“Ownership of valid registration a complete bar to . . . with
respect to that mark, that—
(A) is brought by another person under the common law or a statute of a State; and
(B)(i) seeks to prevent dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment .”).
21 § 1125(d) (“Cyberpiracy prevention”).
22 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (2012) (“Importation of goods bearing infringing marks or names
forbidden”); 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a)
Importation prohibited
Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, it shall be unlawful to import
into the United States any merchandise of foreign manufacture if such
merchandise, or the label, sign, print, package, wrapper, or receptacle, bears a
trademark owned by a citizen of, or by a corporation or association created or
organized within, the United States, and registered in the Patent and Trademark
Office.
23 Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of
Marks, as amended on September 28, 1979, 828 U.N.T.S. 389; see International
13
14
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business owner or artist using a brand in commerce would be well advised to seek
24
registration.
It is clear that without registration a trademark owner would be
operating at a severe disadvantage in the marketplace. The common assertion that a
25
trademark owner can still use a mark in commerce without federal registration
26
makes light of the cumulative advantages obtained through that registration.
III. MATAL V. TAM
At the end of the 2016 term the Supreme Court decided Matal v. Tam, striking
down part of Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act by relying on the First Amendment Free
27
Speech Clause. Matal v. Tam came about as the result of Simon Tam’s attempt to
register “The Slants” as a trademark for the Portland, Oregon, based Asian-American
28
rock band he leads.
The members of the band believed that by choosing “The
Slants”, a term often seen as a derogatory reference to Asian-Americans, they
29
were consciously claiming a slur as a source of ethnic pride.
The United States
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) examined Tam’s application and, after
considering linguistic uses of the term “slants” as reflected in derogatory uses
related to Asian-Americans, refused registration for the use of “The Slants” as a
mark, considering the term to be “disparaging” to a substantial part of the Asian30
American community.
The USPTO’s refusal of registration led to an appeal to the Federal Circuit that
challenged the conclusion of that mark as “disparaging,” and, more importantly, the
Applications/Madrid
Protocol
FAQs,
USPTO
(Aug.
16,
2016,
12:19
AM),
https://www.uspto.gov/trademark/laws-regulations/madrid-protocol/internationalapplicationsmadrid-protocol-faqs. (“Any trademark owner with an application filed in or a
registration issued by the USPTO and who is a national of, has a domicile in, or has a real and
effective industrial or commercial establishment in the United States can submit an international
application through the USPTO.”).
24 Lee Ann W. Lockridge, Abolishing State Trademark Registrations, 29 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 597, 605 (2011) (“[T]he incentives to pursue federal registration . . . are now so significant as to
make federal registration indispensable for any owner making an informed decision about its
trademark rights. A federal registration is the only rational choice . . . .”).
25 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1752 (2017) (citing 3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 19:8 (5th ed. 2018) (“Without federal registration, a valid trademark may still be
used in commerce.”).
26 Id. at 1753 (quoting B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1317)
(“Federal registration, however, ‘confers important legal rights and benefits on trademark owners
who register their marks.’”).
27 Lanham Act § 2(a); 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012); See generally Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744.
28 See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1751
This case concerns a dance-rock band’s application for federal trademark
registration of the band’s name, “The Slants.” “Slants” is a derogatory term for
persons of Asian descent, and members of the band are Asian–Americans. But the
band members believe that by taking that slur as the name of their group, they
will help to “reclaim” the term and drain its denigrating force.
29 See Tam, 808 F.3d at 1331; see also Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1754 (Mr. Tam named his band The
Slants “to ‘reclaim’ and ‘take ownership’ of stereotypes about people of Asian ethnicity.”).
30 In re Tam, 108 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1305, 1310 (T.T.A.B. 2013) (finding “THE SLANTS” mark
to be disqualified from registration under Section 2(a) because “a substantial composite of the
referenced group find the term objectionable”).
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constitutionality of the provision in the Lanham Act that allowed the rejection of
31
“disparaging” trademarks.
In its opinion, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc,
issued a major constitutional decision invalidating the disparagement provision of
the Lanham Act, which had been in place since 1946, and that had been used since
then to reject trademark registrations considered “disparaging” by trademark
32
examiners. This decision reversed the Federal Circuit’s own established precedent
upholding Section 2(a)’s bar on “disparaging” trademarks as not conflicting with the
33
First Amendment.
The Tam en banc decision not only overturned the Federal Circuit’s precedent on
“disparaging” marks but it also set forth a new approach to free speech challenges in
34
the context of commercial speech. This decision asserts that courts should conduct
a strict review of the government’s actions when aimed at the expressive character of
a mark, while acting leniently when reviewing actions directed at the commercial35
speech function of the mark.
The Federal Circuit also reasoned that section 2(a)
36
disparagement clause discriminated both on the basis of content and viewpoint.
The court thought that the disparagement clause discriminated in content as it
37
“applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed.”
The court also held
that when “[t]he PTO rejects marks under section 2(a) when it finds the marks refer
to a group in a negative way, but []permits the registration of marks that refer to a
group in a positive, non-disparaging manner[,]” § 2(a) discriminates on the basis of
38
viewpoint. Finally, because § 2(a) acted as a restriction denying registration only
based on the mark’s perceived “disparaging” message, the section failed the strict
39
scrutiny analysis for expressive speech.

31 “Mr. Tam argues that the Board erred in finding the mark THE SLANTS disparaging under §
2(a) of the Lanham Act and therefore unregistrable. Mr. Tam also challenges the constitutionality of
§ 2(a).” In re Tam (Tam Panel Decision), 785 F.3d 567, 569 (Fed. Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc granted,
opinion vacated, 600 F. App’x 775 (Fed. Cir.), and on reh’g en banc, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir.), as
corrected (Feb. 11, 2016), aff’d sub nom., Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
32 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1358 (holding that “the disparagement provision of § 2(a) is
unconstitutional because it violates the First Amendment”).
33 See In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (holding that “[n]o conduct is
proscribed, and no tangible form of expression is suppressed. Consequently, appellant’s First
Amendment rights would not be abridged by the refusal to register his mark [under Section 2(a)]”).
34 See In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1338 (“The disparagement provision must be assessed under First
Amendment standards applicable to what it targets, which is not the commercial-speech function of
the mark . . . This is not a government regulation aimed at the commercial component of speech.”).
35 Id.
36 In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1334 (“The Disparagement Provision, Which Discriminates Based on
Disapproval of the Message, Is Not Content or Viewpoint Neutral.”).
37 Id. at 1335 (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015)).
38 Id. at 1336.
39 Id. at 1337.
The government enacted § 2(a), and defends it today, because it is hostile to the
messages conveyed by the refused marks. Section 2(a) is a viewpointdiscriminatory regulation of speech, created and applied in order to stifle the use
of certain disfavored messages. Strict scrutiny therefore governs its First
Amendment assessment—and no argument has been made that the measure
survives such scrutiny.
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40

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2016 and held oral arguments in
early 2017 to finally settle the question of the disparagement clause’s
41
constitutionality.
By mid-2017 the court issued a plurality opinion striking down
the disparagement clause as unconstitutional and affirming the Federal Circuit’s
42
earlier decision.
In affirming that decision, the Court cemented the holding that
trademarks are not a form of government speech or a government subsidy or
43
program.
The Court explained that if private speech were to be "passed off as
government speech by simply affixing a government seal of approval" the government
44
would be free to "silence or muffle the expression of disfavored viewpoints."
As a
result of this decision, and despite the fact that the wording of section 2(a) remains
unaltered, the USPTO may no longer refuse marks on the grounds that it finds them
to be disparaging.
IV. IN RE BRUNETTI
Matal v. Tam settled the issue of the disparaging clause’s constitutionality but
left unaddressed the same question on immoral or scandalous marks. In 2013 Eric
Brunetti attempted to register the mark FUCT, for use in apparel, as a coined
45
acronym for “Friends yoU Can’t Trust.” The USPTO promptly refused registration
on grounds that the mark violated section2(a) of the Lanham Act as “scandalous” or
46
“immoral.” Brunetti sought an appeal from the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
(TTAB), but the Board affirmed the examiner’s refusal to register the mark on the
47
same grounds, that the mark was scandalous.
Brunetti then appealed to the
Federal Circuit and that court agreed with the Board that the mark was vulgar and
48
therefore immoral and scandalous. The Court came to the conclusion that FUCT is
phonetically identical to the vulgarity for which it is a homonym and as such failing
49
on the grounds of the scandalous clause of section 2(a).
The Court looked at
definitions of “scandalous” including “shocking to the sense of truth, decency, or
propriety,” “giving offense to the conscience or moral feelings,” or “disgraceful,”
40 In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. granted, Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (Sept. 29,
2016) (No. 16-174).
41
Oral Argument, Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016) (No. 15-1293),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/audio/2016/15-1293[https://perma.cc/Q49XA9SU]; see
also Marcia Coyle & Tony Mauro, Gorsuch’s SCOTUS Vote Could Soon Prove Decisive on Many
Cases; Senate Confirms Gorsuch 54-45 to Fill Scalia Vacancy, NAT’L L.J. (Apr. 7, 2017),
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202783207725/GorsuchsSCOTUS-Vote-Could-Soon-ProveDecisive-on-Many-Cases?slreturn=20170906141452[https://perma.cc/4LX9-SRUN].
42 See generally Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer and
Kennedy joining Justice Alito’s opinion, with Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joining
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence.
43 Id. at 1757–64.
44 Id. at 1758.
45 In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330, 1339 (2017).
46 Id. at 1337.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. (“[T]he word “fuct” is defined by Urban Dictionary as the past tense of the verb “fuck” and
pronounced the same as the word “fucked,” and therefore found it is “recognized as a slang and
literal equivalent of the word ‘fucked,’” with “the same vulgar meaning.”).
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“offensive,” or “disreputable” and concluded that Brunetti’s argument that a vulgar
50
mark would not necessarily be scandalous was invalid.
However, based on the
rationale of Matal v. Tam, the Federal Circuit concluded that the bar on registration
of such scandalous marks, like that on disparaging marks, violated the First
51
Amendment.
Consequently, the Court reversed the Board’s decision on the
52
registrability of the mark and allowed registration.
With that reversal of the
Board’s decision the bar on registration of scandalous marks was effectively removed.
The USPTO, however, filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari which the Supreme Court
53
granted in January 2019.
In the petition, the USPTO recognized the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Matal v. Tam, but it sought review arguing that Section 2(a)’s
54
prohibition against scandalous marks should be treated differently.
The USPTO
concluded that “[Section 2(a)] does not prohibit any speech, proscribe any conduct or
55
restrict the use of any trademark.”
Rather, “[t]he scandalous-marks provision
simply reflects Congress’s judgment that the federal government should not
affirmatively promote the use of graphic sexual images and vulgar terms by granting
56
them the benefits of registration.”
The point of the USPTO’s argument in the
petition for the Writ of Certiorari was that Section 2(a) does not prohibit or restrict
speech, but establishes permissible eligibility requirements for a federal trademark
57
registration – requirements that are properly viewpoint-neutral.
V. DISCUSSION
In 2015, Professor Megan Carpenter and, then law student, Mary Garner
58
published an article based on their empirical study of scandalous trademarks.
Their study analyzed which marks where rejected under section 2(a) and what
59
evidence was used to reject those marks.
By looking at the marks actually being
rejected they compiled a number of key terms considered “immoral” or “scandalous”
60
by the examiners.
In order to narrow the scope of this study, we followed the
61
position of the Federal Circuit in Brunetti on vulgar marks and looked at the level
50 Id. (“We have previously held “the PTO may prove scandalousness by establishing that a
mark is ‘vulgar.’” We are bound by these holdings.”). Id. (citations omitted).
51 Id. at 1341 (“The Court explained the disparagement provision ‘offends a bedrock First
Amendment principle: Speech may not be banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that
offend.’”).
52 Id. at 1357 (“We hold that the bar in § 2(a) against immoral or scandalous marks is
unconstitutional because it violates the First Amendment. We reverse the Board’s holding that Mr.
Brunetti’s mark is unregistrable under § 2(a).”).
53 Iancu v. Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 139 S.Ct. 782 (2019).
54 See generally, Pet. For Writ of Cert., Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S.Ct. 782 (2019) (No. 18-302).
55 Pet. For Writ of Cert. at 10, Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S.Ct. 782 (2019) (No. 18-302).
56 Id. at 12.
57 Id. at 19 (“As the Court’s Tam decision establishes, such criteria must be viewpoint-neutral to
survive Free Speech Clause review.”).
58 Megan M. Carpenter & Mary Garner, NSFW: An Empirical Study of Scandalous
Trademarks, 33 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 321 (2015).
59 Id. at 321. (“This study analyzes which marks are being rejected, what evidence is being used
to reject them, and who the applicants are.”).
60 See generally id.
61 In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1337.
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62

of registrations after that decision. Like Justice Stewart before them , the Federal
Circuit did not define the meanings of "vulgar," "immoral," and "scandalous" in the
Brunetti decision. The statute sets “immoral” and “scandalous” as distinct kinds of
marks, yet the analysis by TTAB and the courts has focused on registration of
63
“scandalous” marks.
“The reported decisions reflect courts' treatment of
“scandalous” alone as the standard, or use the two terms together or
64
interchangeably.” Those three terms: “vulgar,” “scandalous” and “immoral,” are
similar to, and perhaps even synonymous with, the meaning of the Federal
65
Communications Commission’s (FCC) term "indecent."
For the purposes of this study we will use comedian George Carlin’s “The Seven
66
Words You Can Never Say on Television” (“Seven Words”) as a gauge to measure
62 In Jacobellis v. Ohio, a case in which Nico Jacobellis, the manager of a movie theater in
Cleveland Heights, Ohio, was convicted of violating an Ohio obscenity statute by possessing and
exhibiting “The Lovers,” a French film depicting an unhappy marriage and the wife’s falling in love
with a young archaeologist, and including in the last reel an explicit, but fragmentary and fleeting,
love scene, Justice Potter Stewart, wrote of obscenity:
I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to
be embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never
succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture
involved in this case is not that.
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 at 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
63 M. Christopher Bolen, Richard J. Caira, Jr. & Jason S. Wood, When Scandal Becomes Vogue:
The Registrability of Sexual References in Trademarks and Protection of Trademarks from
Tarnishment in Sexual Contexts, 39 IDEA 435, 438 (1999) (“Although the statute appears to
differentiate between ‘immoral’ and ‘scandalous’ as two separate types of unregistrable marks,
examiners, the TTAB, and the courts have focused their registration analysis on the meaning of
‘scandalous’ rather than ‘immoral.’ The two words have been virtually treated as a single basis for
refusal of registration.”).
64 Id. n.11 (citing McGinley, 660 F.2d at 484, 211 U.S.P.Q. at 672) (“deciding the case solely on
‘scandalous’ definition, while referring to statute's prohibition of ‘immoral’ or ‘scandalous’ marks; In
re Madsen, 180 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 334, 335 (Trademark Tr. & App. Bd. 1973) (TTAB considered
registrability on ‘immoral’ or ‘scandalous’ grounds, holding that WEEK-END SEX was neither
scandalous nor immoral as magazine title”).
65
Obscene,
Indecent
and
Profane
Broadcasts,
FED.
COMMC’NS
COMM’N,
https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/obscene-indecent-and-profane-broadcasts
(last
updated/reviewed Sept. 13, 2017) (“Indecent content portrays sexual or excretory organs or activities
in a way that does not meet the three-prong test for obscenity.”). The three-pronged test alluded to
in the FCC’s page is the Miller test for obscenity established by the Supreme Court in Miller v.
California. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (“A state offense must also be limited to works
which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a
patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value.”).
66 “The Seven Words You Can Never Say on Television” or “Filthy Words” is a routine by
comedian George Carlin in his 1972 comedy album “Class Clown,” which enumerates a list of words
not fit for transmission over the air. The Seven Words were not then, and are not now, a part of an
official list issued by the FCC or any other government agency but, at the time, they were considered
unsuitable for broadcast on public airwaves in the U.S. George Carlin, The Seven Words You Can
Never Say on Television, Genius, https://genius.com/George-carlin-the-seven-words-you-can-neversay-on-television-annotated (last visited Nov. 13, 2018). A radio broadcast of Carlin’s routine by
WBAI, a Pacifica Foundation FM radio station in New York City, in 1973 led to a Supreme Court
case, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978), that upheld the FCC’s ban on
the Seven Words deciding that the words were “indecent but not obscene.” Id. at 729. The Seven
Words are: shit (word 1), piss (word 2), fuck (word 3), cunt (word 4), cocksucker (word 5),
motherfucker (word 6) and tits (word 7).

[18:404 2019]The F Word - An Empirical Study of Trademark Registration of
Scandalous and Immoral Marks in the Aftermath of the In re Brunetti Decision

413

the number of registrations that might have been denied as “immoral” or
“scandalous” under section 2(a). We settled on the use of the Seven Words, taking a
cue from early commentators that the Brunetti decision would “extend beyond
67
Carlin’s seven dirty words,” expecting that if that assertion were accurate, the
Seven Words would provide an appropriate weather gauge for “immoral” or
“scandalous” registrations. The Seven Words are not only concerned with the sex or
sexual activities of the Miller test for obscenity but also include the “indecent
68
content” of “excretory organs or activities” mentioned in the FCC guidelines.
The
TTAB had not only refused registration to marks as immoral or scandalous under a
69
sexual context but also for profanity or vulgarity.
We are conscious that when
dealing with ideas of what constitutes “vulgar,” “scandalous” or “immoral,”
perceptions change over time according to attitudes and community standards and,
as such, we chose the Seven Words because they still fall within the FCC
70
guidelines.
A. Methodology
In this study we looked at all the applications for registrations, live or dead,
71
contained in the USPTO’s Trademark Electronic Search System (TESS) database
that might contain one or more of the Seven Words. We searched not only for the
accurate spelling of the Seven Words but for alternative spellings as well because, as
in the case of Brunetti’s FUCT registration, the USPTO had rejected alternative
72
spellings or stand-ins for vulgarities before.
We included alternative or stand-in
spellings along with the proper spellings of the Seven Words for a better picture of
the dataset. Word marks that included any of the Seven Words but which were
obviously not intended to be alternatives, stand in’s or double entendres for the
73
original were systematically removed from the search results.
The date of the
Brunetti decision, 15 December 2017, is used as a benchmark, and we divided our
findings by registrations made before and after that date. Furthermore, we looked at
the number of monthly registrations made after December 15th to determine if there
was a noticeable trend either way.

See supra note 3.
See supra note 60.
69 See In re Tinseltown, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 863, *3 (T.T.A.B. 1981) (“[T]he fact that
profane words may be uttered more freely does not render them any the less profane. Nor does this
fact amend the statute by which we are required to determine the registrability of such matter as
marks.”).
70 See supra note 60.
71 TRADEMARK ELECTRONIC SEARCH SYSTEM (TESS), USPTO, http://tess2.uspto.gov/
(last updated Mar. 31, 2019).
72 Nancy Friedman, Trademarks the Government Doesn’t Want You to See, STRONG LANGUAGE:
A
SWEARY
BLOG
ABOUT
SWEARING
(Sept.
29,
2015),
https://stronglang.wordpress.com/2015/09/29/guest-post-trademarks-the-government-doesnt-wantyou-to-see/. (“The USPTO will generally not register marks that are stand-ins for vulgar words.”).
73 E.g., the word P’TIT, used as an alternative spelling for the French “petit” (small), which has
no connection to the corresponding TIT in the Seven Words.
67
68
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B. Aftermath
“Less than a month after the decision in Brunetti, there were 63 applications for
74
marks containing the word "FUCK" in its full, uncensored, and proper spelling.”
The following numbers will be a breakdown of the number of applications for
registration before and after 15 December 2017 (the Brunetti date), by each of the
Seven Words and the status of those registrations beginning with registrations
containing Word 1 in all found forms and continuing with the remaining six words in
75
the order they appear in Carlin’s “Filthy Words” routine.

1. Word 1
The numbers reflect that Word 1 is the most popular of the Seven Words among
trademark registrants. As of the end of March 2019, there were 376 registrations in
76
TESS containing the word.
Of those registrations, 269 were made before the
77
Brunetti date with 167 in dead status and 102 in live status as of that date. Of the
78
107 registrations done after Brunetti, only one is in dead status.
Monthly
registrations for Word 1 hovered in the mid-single digits in 2018, with one exception:
79
in March of 2018 the number of registrations spiked up to 17.
Table 1a:
Before
12/15/17

Rest
of Dec
2017

Jan
2018

Feb
2018

Mar
2018

April
2018

May
2018

Jun
e
2018

269
July
2018
7

4

9
Sept
2018
8

7
Oct
2018
10

17
Nov
2018
8

4
Dec
2018
7

7
Jan
2019
2

4
Feb
2019
5

Aug
2018
5

Mar
2019
3

Table 1b:
Dead before
12/15/17
167

74
75
76
77
78
79

Live before
12/15/17
102

Dead after
12/15/17
1

Drew Wilson, Slants Rule, L.A. LAW., May 2018, at 30, 34.
See supra note 66.
See infra Table 1b.
See infra Table 1a.
See infra Table 1a.
See infra Table 1a.

Live after
12/15/17
106

Total
376
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2. Word 2
Word 2 was not as popular with trademark registrants, coming in at number
four with only 58 registrations by the end of March 2019.80 A total of 50 registrations
had been entered in TESS before the Brunetti date.81 Of those early applications 38
were already in dead status by the Brunetti date, while twelve still survived fifteen
months later.82 Of the eight registrations submitted after the Brunetti date seven
were still on live status in March, 2019.83
Table 2a:
Before
12/15/17

Jan
2018

Mar
2018

June
2018

Aug
2018

Nov
2018

Dec
2018

Mar
2019

50

1

1

1

2

1

1

1

Table 2b:
Dead before
12/15/17
38
3.

Live before
12/15/17
12

Dead after
12/15/17
1

Live after
12/15/17
7

Total
58

Word 3

Following Word 1, Word 3 was the second most popular word with registrants
with 378 attempts at registration.84 Almost three quarters of those applications, a
total of 273, were made before the Brunetti date, with 180 in dead status and 93 still
live by March, 2019.85 All of the 105 registrations done after Brunetti, were still in
live status by March, 201.86 Like the registrations for Word 1, these registrations
hovered in the single digits throughout the eleven months after Brunetti, with a
spike of 11 in August, 2018 and another of 16 in February, 2019.87
Table 3a:
Before
12/15/17
273
July
2018
8
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87

Rest of
Dec
2017
5
Aug
2018
14

See infra Table 2b.
See infra Table 2a.
See infra Table 2a.
See infra Table 2a.
See infra Table 3b.
See infra Table 3a.
See infra Table 3a.
See infra Table 3a.

Jan
2018

Feb
2018

Mar
2018

April
2018

May
2018

June
2018

9
Sept
2018
5

4
Oct
2018
3

9
Nov
2018
2

10
Dec
2018
6

4
Jan
2019
4

3
Feb
2019
16

Mar
2019
3
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Table 3b:
Dead before
12/15/17
180

Live before
12/15/17
93

Dead after
12/15/17
0

Live after
12/15/17
105

Total
378

4. Word 4
Word 4 was not a popular choice, ranking second from the bottom of the Seven
Words, with only seven entries in TESS.88 Of those seven entries, four were made
before the Brunetti date and all are in dead status.89 The three registrations made
after Brunetti were all live by March, 2019.90
Table 4a:
Before
12/15/17

Jan
2018
2

4

Jun
2018
1

Table 4b:
Dead before
12/15/17
3

Live before
12/15/17
1

Dead after
12/15/17
0

Live after
12/15/17
3

Total
7

5. Word 5
The least popular of all entries with only three attempts before the Brunetti date
and all three in dead status.91 As of March 2019 there were no other attempted
registrations for this word.
Table 5a:
Before 12/15/17
3
Table 5b:
Dead before
12/15/17
3

Live before
12/15/17
0

88
89
90
91

See infra Table 4b.
See infra Table 4a.
See infra Table 4a.
See infra Tables 5a, 5b.

Dead after
12/15/17
0

Live after
12/15/17
0

Total
3
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6. Word 6
With 19 total registrations, Word 6 is number five in terms of frequency on the
list.92 Of that number, 17 were made before the Brunetti date and only 4 of those
were still live in March, 2019.93 The two registrations made after Brunetti were still
live as of March, 2019.94
Table 6a
Before
12/15/17
17
Table 6b
Dead before
12/15/17
13

May
2018
1

Sep
2018
1

Live before
12/15/17
4

Dead after
12/15/17
0

Live after
12/15/17
2

Total
19

7. Word 7
Word 7 was the third most popular choice among registrants with 111 entries
total.95 Before the Brunetti date, there were 99 entries with 77 in dead status by
March 2019.96 The 12 registrations made after the Brunetti date were all still in live
status as of March 2019.97
Table 7a:
Before
12/15/17
99

Jan
2018
1

Jun
2018
1

Aug
2018
1

Oct
2018
5

Nov
2018
1

Dec
2018
1

Jan
2019
1

Feb
2019
1

Table 7b:
Dead before
12/15/17
77

92
93
94
95
96
97

Live before
12/15/17
22

See infra Table 6b.
See infra Tables 6a, 6b.
See infra Tables 6a, 6b.
See infra Table 7b.
See infra Tables 7a, 7b.
See infra Table 7b.

Dead after
12/15/17
0

Live after
12/15/17
12

Total
111
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VI. CONCLUSION
Prior to Brunetti, the USPTO appeared “willing to register crude, sexually
oriented or suggestive marks, as long as there (was) some "clean" association or
98
symbol to defuse the scandalous alternative.”
That interpretation by the USPTO
paved the way for registration of marks that could have been considered “scandalous”
or “immoral” if they had alternative meanings. Brunetti changed the need for mental
gymnastics by clearing the path based on the First Amendment argument used by
the Supreme Court in Tam. While not widespread, there was some initial concern
that the loosening of restraints would cause a dramatic increase in registration of
99
marks formerly kept out by the restraints of Section 2(a).
With the request by the
USPTO for review of the Brunetti it appears that the USPTO is unwilling to give up
completely on Section 2(a) by arguing that “scandalous” or “immoral” marks are
unlike “disparaging” marks in that the refusal to register “scandalous” or “immoral”
marks do violate the constitutional limitations affording protection to speech because
100
Section 2(a) is view-point neutral.
The Supreme Court has three options in this
case. It could follow the precedent set by Tam, it could adopt the USPTO’s proposal
from the petition for cert or it could adopt Judge Dyk’s concurring opinion in
Brunetti. In his concurrence, Judge Dyk proposed that the court is “obligated to
101
construe the statute as to avoid . . . constitutional questions.”
He reasons that
Section 2(a) should be limited to only include obscene marks, which are not covered
102
by the First Amendment.
Judge Dyk’s concurrence in Brunetti would appear to be
a perfect solution for the Supreme Court. The Section 2(a) bar on disparaging and
scandalous marks are really two different issues with different analysis. The Tam
decision does not make that distinction clear but if the Supreme Court were to
narrow the construction of Section 2(a) to obscenity, the USPTO would be able to
keep the spirit of the section while preventing the registration of “the most patently
103
obscene marks.”
It is still too early to tell what the results of the Tam and Brunetti decisions will
be on trademark registrations of formerly banned marks or what the Supreme Court
will decide when hearing the case. However, this study indicates that for the time
being there doesn’t seem to have been much of a flood behind the anticipated
floodgates. It is quite possible that registrations for these types of marks may
increase as Tam and Brunetti become entrenched in the marketplace of ideas, but,
for now, there is no empirical support for the concern that will happen.

Supra note 58.
Supra note 4.
100 Pet. For Writ of Cert. at 19, Brunetti, 139 S.Ct. 782 (2019) (No. 18-302) (“Unlike the
disparagement provision that the Court struck down in Tam, the scandalous-marks provision is
viewpoint-neutral.”).
101 In re Brunetti, 877 F.3d at 1358.
102 Id. (“One such fairly possible reading is available to us here by limiting the clause's reach to
obscene marks, which are not protected by the First Amendment.”).
103 Id. at 1361.
98
99
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VII. POSTSCRIPT
In June of 2019, the Supreme Court settled the question by upholding the
Federal Circuit’s decision that Lanham Act’s Section 2(a) prohibition against
registration of “immoral” or “scandalous” marks violates the First Amendment.104 In
her majority opinion, Justice Kagan emphasized that, to survive review, registration
criteria for federal trademark protection must be viewpoint-neutral leading to the
question of whether the immoral or scandalous bar is viewpoint-neutral or viewpoint
based.105 According to Kagan, the Act allows “registration of marks that champion
society’s sense of rectitude and morality, but not marks that denigrate those
concepts.”106 By fostering exclusion of marks that defy the societal sense of decency
and propriety, the Act distinguishes between two opposing sets of ideas resulting in
viewpoint discrimination.107 The majority opinion then centers on supporting Tam’s
finding that a “law disfavoring ideas that offend discriminates based on viewpoint, in
violation of the First Amendment.”108
The idea of a narrower bar preventing registration for vulgar terms proposed by
Judge Dyk in his dissent at the Federal Circuit found traction with four of the
Justices but that was not enough to carry it over the top.109 Justice Sotomayor saw
the majority’s finding of viewpoint discrimination as a failure to recognize that the
terms “immoral” and “scandalous” do not present a unified standard.110 Sotomayor
proposes that “scandalous” standing alone is ambiguous and that the term can be
narrowed to cover only “offensive modes of expression.”111 She reasons that the
statute uses the words “disparage” and “immoral” to cover “marks that are offensive
because they are disparaging and marks that are offensive because they are
immoral,”112 but that “scandalous” should not be conflated with “immoral” as it can
104 Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2302 (2019) (“There are a great many immoral and
scandalous ideas in the world . . . and the Lanham Act cover them all. It therefore violates the First
Amendment. We accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.”).
105 Id. at 2299 (“‘[T]he criteria for federal trademark registration’ must be ‘viewpoint-neutral to
survive Free Speech Clause review.’ . . . . So the key question becomes: Is the ‘immoral or
scandalous’ criterion in the Lanham Act viewpoint-neutral or viewpoint-based?”) (internal citations
omitted).
106 Id.
107 Id. at 2300 (“[T]he Lanham Act allows registration of marks when their messages accord
with, but not when their messages defy, society’s sense of decency or propriety. Put the pair of
overlapping terms together and the statute, on its face, distinguishes between two opposed sets of
ideas . . . .”).
108 Id. at 2301 (internal quotation marks omitted).
109 Alito, Roberts, Breyer and Sotomayor all supported either a reading of the statute
separating the interpretations of “immoral” and “scandalous” and narrowing the construction of
“scandalous” to just those marks that could be considered vulgar or obscene (Roberts, Breyer and
Sotomayor) or urging Congress to adopt a more carefully drawn version of the statute precluding
registration for vulgar terms (Alito). See generally id. at 2302 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 2303
(Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2304 (Breyer, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); id. at 2308 (Sotomayor, J., joined by Breyer, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
110 Id. at 2308 (Sotomayor, J., joined by Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“The majority finds viewpoint discrimination here by treating the terms ‘scandalous’ and ‘immoral’
as comprising a unified standard . . . . ”).
111 Id. at 2309.
112 Id. at 2310.
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cover a “distinct type of offensiveness: offensiveness in the mode of communication
rather than the idea.”113 Sotomayor believes that “[a]dopting a narrow construction
for the word “scandalous”—interpreting it to regulate only obscenity, vulgarity, and
profanity” can save the Section 2(a) from unconstitutionality.114 Sotomayor worries
that there may be a rush to register marks with vulgar, profane or obscene words as
their primary feature and that the Government is left powerless to avoid that rush.115
This short preliminary study proves that the rush really didn’t materialize after Tam
and that it is unlikely that it will materialize because of this decision.
Sotomayor’s analysis of the statute is a solid interpretation of how Section 2(a)
could have been saved allowing complete latitude to the First Amendment and yet
using “scandalous” to prevent registration of obscene, vulgar or profane terms. She
came close to carrying the day but ultimately, the three other Justices that agreed
with her were not enough.

113
114
115

Id.
Id. at 2313.
Id. at 2308.

